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ABSTRACT
In recent years the management of Navy maintenance and
material resources has been lagging behind technological pro-
gress. Decision makers have been unable to obtain the infor-
mation necessary to exercise proper control over operational
requirements, and the existing maintenance organization could
not provide answers to questions concerning systems readiness
in relation to manpower, material, and time expenditures. A
new program, the Standard Navy Maintenance Management System
(SNMMS), was designed to improve overall readiness.
Data used in this study was gathered from Navy, Air Force,
and management sources. Contemporary techniques were synthe-
sized and compared to those being used within SNMMS.
The "3 M System" is a highly desirable improvement in Navy
maintenance. Although a few fundamental weaknesses do exist, a
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For years Navy maintenance functions have been administered,
scheduled, and controlled through the use of charts, codes, grease
pencils and colored tapes. These aids have frequently been rough
estimates at best. They normally portray but one path toward the
ultimate goal which is the highest attainable degree of fleet and
material readiness. Little thought is given to alternative plans,
and very little to the inter-relationships and tradeoffs among in-
dividual tasks contained within the portrayed plan. If a project
is even moderately extensive, the likelihood is great that some-
where in its evolution, a single task not previously considered,
will delay completion.
In 1959, thoroughly planned and scheduled, uniformly organized
maintenance was being closely considered at the highest levels
within the Navy. Among other things, the Naval Aircraft Mainte-
nance Program, a first in standardization of organizations on a
Navy wide scale, was promulgated. Further, Admiral Arleigh A.
Burke, then Chief of Naval Operations, became aware of certain
British work study techniques through conversations with the First
Sea Lord of the Admiralty. Admiral Burke sent a group of Navy
Chief of the Bureau of Naval Weapons, The Naval Ai rcraf
t
Maintenance Program . BUWEPS I NST 4700.2. (Washington: 21 June,
1962), p. 2-3.

Officers to Britain to evaluate this new idea and explore the
2
feasibility of incorporating it into the U. S. Navy. The bene-
fits attainable through work study, essentially the application
of industrial engineering techniques, favorably impressed the
visiting officers and culminated in the establishment of Fleet
Work Study Groups. These groups were assigned the mission of
employing engineering techniques "where directed by the Chief of
Naval Operations based on requests received from within the naval
establishment in order to determine and recommend the best possi-
3ble use of human and material resources."
Early in its existence, the Pacific Work Study Group under-
took a project to determine how to reduce the down time incident
to scheduled maintenance in a light attack squadron. Industrial
engineering techniques were adapted to the circumstances and
successfully employed. Quality control was enhanced, down time
was cut by two-thirds, and availability was increased by a margin
which was equivalent to an additional five aircraft. These
techniques were again and again applied with continuing success
to other units of both fleets. By 1962, the advantages of the
work study techniques were widely known and well supported by
actual performance.- The decision was subsequently made and pro-
mulgated by the Chief of Naval Operations to install a standard
2
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maintenance management system throughout the operating forces. In
addition, a parallel maintenance data collection and analysis
system was to be designed and installed. The new program, known as
the Standard Navy Maintenance Management System (SNMMS), frequently
referred to as the "3 M System" (Material Maintenance Management),
is presently being implemented by the Fleet Work Study Groups.
Unlike previous maintenance reorganizations, SNMMS is intended to
be considerably more than a mere change of labels. It is to be
firmly based on the Total Systems Concept (TSC) . Simply stated,
TSC calls for an overall study of all the systems and tasks of an
organization before making major revisions in any one area. This
does not mean that everything has to be changed at once, but
rather that the overall plan be implemented in individual areas
over a period of time. SNMMS is closely related to the findings
and recommendations contained in the Review Of Management Of The
Department Of The Navy (Dill ion Report) and is designed to provide
much of the quantitative information now so necessary within the
defense establishment. The system, considered by its advocates
to be compatible with both the old and the new, will be especially
desirable in areas of advanced technology when dealing with
expensive, sophisticated, modern weapon systems.
The Problem
Presently the Navy exists in an era of complex, quick-time,
operational requirements. Decision makers must have the best
possible continuing control over all operations for which they
are responsible. Command and management are daily required to
3

make more and more complex decisions while having less time in
which to consider the various possible results. A quick-time
operational maintenance system, capable of analyzing and feeding
back timely, significant information is a highly desirable goal.
An expansion of SNMMS , if the system is successful, must be able
to provide this. Meanwhile, efficient and effective management
calls for sound planning and competent restraints against tech-
niques that might possibly result in costly confusion and delays,
personnel errors, inaccuracy, misinterpretation, and slowdowns.
Initially, therefore, the Standard Navy Maintenance Management
System must keep management constantly informed as to what
decisions to make so that maintenance operations will be in
consonance with operational plans and schedules and lead to the
desired results. In other words, a system must be devised that
is highly reliable, has rapid response, and a problem solving
capability that assists command to act promptly in controlling
personnel and equipment before, during, and after a required
operation. As such, SNMMS essentially must be a command and
control organization closely allied to an effective logistics
system.
FEASIBILITY
Is a system of this type, capable of providing the required
information, feasible? A few years ago, the answer would have
been a qualified maybe. Today the answer is a definite unqualified
yes. The reason is the computer. The present equipment evolution
within the Navy from relative simplicity to extreme complexity,

has correspondingly increased the quality, quantity, and frequency
of maintenance demanded. An increase in required direct mainte-
nance labor would ordinarily be accompanied by an increase in the
indirect labor requirements to perform the paperwork functions of
administration, records, and reports. However, with the advent of
the computer, which one federal official refers to as the "greatest
development in government administration since government began,
"
:>
it is presently considered possible to essentially hold the line
in the area of indirect personnel requirements.
CHOOSING THE OPTIMUM
Is SNMMS the logical choice? Have all its problem areas been
sought out, investigated, and evaluated? Has SNMMS been judged
superior to other systems? Will the system be readily accepted
and supported by maintenance personnel? Are the users likely to
trust SNMMS? Will SNMMS replace other functions or will it
simply duplicate them? These are a few of the questions that
should have been asked and answered in the affirmative prior to
the commencement of system installation. Were they?
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
It is the purpose of this paper (1) to comprehensively review
performed and contemplated actions in the Standard Navy Maintenance
Management System (SNMMS), its subdivisions, the Planned Mainte-
nance System (PMS), and the Maintenance Data Collection System
-'Richard F. Janssen, "Federal Computers, Electronic Devices
Aid Government Efficiency But Create Problems," The Wall Street
Journal
, December 30, 1964, pp. 1, 8.

(MDCS); and (2) to analyze the system as designed and installed,
contrasting its goals, techniques, and objectives to a synthesis
of some of the principles set forth by management and data col-
lection/processing authorities.
ASSUMPTIONS
The assumption is herein made that the Navy will find it to
be in the best interests of efficiency, effectiveness, and accuracy
to utilize certain management and automatic data processing (ADP)
techniques in a manner similar to that advocated by modern managers
and employed by industry. Further, it is also assumed that
"effective production of a coordinated and uninterrupted flow of
essential data needed by management in its decision-making, con-
trol, and planning functions, through the systematic organization
of all related clerical functions," known as integrated data
processing (IDP), is highly desirable.
6
Harvey W. Protzel , "What Top Management Should Expect From
An Integrated Data Processing System," Computers And Automation
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Much has been written on the subject of Navy Maintenance.
Until very recently, the vast majority of related items dealt
with repair procedures and techniques, required inspections,
material allowances, after the fact reports, and other tradi-
tional maintenance functions. Little, if anything, concerned
with command relationships, responsibilities, preventive
maintenance planning, organization, the various fields of main-
tenance management control, efficiency, or effectiveness, was
produced and promulgated. In the last several years the content
of Navy maintenance related literature has changed somewhat in
order to reflect current interest in the areas mentioned above
and the increasing need for coordination, accurate information,
timeliness, sound policies, and knowledgeable application of
management and leadership techniques. Still, information con-
cerning Navy maintenance, based on sound management concepts,
is limited. The Fleet Work Study Group, Pacific, responsible for
the development and installation of the Standard Navy Maintenance
System (SNMMS) in the operating forces of the Pacific Fleet, was
the major source of planned maintenance and Navy data collection
related literature obtained. In addition, Fleet Work Study Group,
Pacific, provided pertinent audio-visual information during a
series of presentations and conferences.
In order to effectively review, analyze, and evaluate SNMMS,

it was necessary to broaden the literature review. Sources in-
cluded applicable Navy documents, supplemented by Air Force
maintenance management directives, the works of various management
and data processing authorities, and a few related unpublished
papers.
Navy Literature
Navy literature, in general limited to directives, corre-
spondence, and a few service magazine articles, is of recent
origin but rather scarce. In the main it is concerned with the
background of Navy maintenance, the reasons why SNMMS was de-
veloped, the concepts SNMMS employs, and a few progress reports.
Another important aspect is the overall interest in the system
readily displayed in the correspondence of the Chief of Naval
Operations, various type commanders, and other flag officers.
A high degree of optimism appears to be the common denominator
in this area.
Air Force Literature
Of considerable assistance as a preliminary information
source is the Ai r Force Maintenance Management Manual which sets
forth the maintenance management system for all Air Force activi-
ties. This document was used during the initial design stages of
SNMMS as a guide for the development of workable data collection/
processing techniques.
Academic and Management Authorities
Material of this nature is available in considerable depth.
Works that scan the management spectrum, from the quantitative to
the human behavioral oriented, are readily accessable in the U. S.
8

Naval Postgraduate School library and text book issue. Publi-
cations of learned groups, such as the American Management
Association, in addition to various other sources including
magazines, newspapers, and house organs, were reviewed.
The Review
Source material was examined beginning with the Air Force
literature and the works of the academic and management author-
ities. An effort was made to assimilate applicable Air Force
methods, techniques, and procedures, compare these with the
theories and concepts of a wide range of respected management
authorities, and then synthesize the resulting ideas into a
methodical survey and analysis of the Planned Maintenance System
(PMS) and the Maintenance Data Collection System (MDCS) .
Coupled with a knowledge of the past workings and short-
comings of Navy maintenance, this method, although time consuming,
did provide a suitable background for analysis and evaluation of
SNMMS. Furthermore, this approach not only provided a contrast
between the old and new in Navy maintenance, but also between the
past and present in other aspects of Navy management. Where only
a few years ago we could expect to encounter relatively unsophisti-
cated, inflexible (frequently attributing this inflexibility to the
traditions of the Navy) managers, we now encounter an increasing
number of sophisticated and well-informed thinkers and managers,
advancing their capabilities to match the advances in our complex
weapon systems. The inertia to resist change in techniques has
not been totally eliminated, but the high degree of optimism
9

concerning the benefits of SNMMS, readily apparent at all levels of
Navy management, makes this inertia somewhat less discernible.
This in itself should prove to be of great value if only because






MAINTENANCE: SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION
During recent years it has become apparent that the proper
management of maintenance and material resources within the
operating forces of the Navy was lagging behind advances in
technology. Maintenance functions were in many instances handi-
capped by a lack of decision making information. Weapons systems
were ever increasing in number and complexity, while maintenance
procedures, maintenance information, and the average maintenance
man were tending toward obsolescence. Fortunately, prior to
chaos, it became evident that the newer, sophisticated systems were
demanding a greater percentage of an already short supply of main-
tenance capability. What was to be done about this situation?
With the maintenance practices then in existence, no determination
could be made as to whether over-maintenance in some areas was
causing or contributing to this rapidly mounting shortage, or if
the condition of under-maintenance, known to exist on the complex
systems, was general.
It became apparent that a method must be devised to measure
systems readiness in relation to the outlay in materials, time, and
manpower. The basic methods, formulated around the newer complex
weapons systems, were then extended to include all the activities
of the Navy responsible for the maintenance, support, operation,
management control or technical direction of units of the operating
forces.

The approach decided upon was the development and implemen-
tation of a Standard Navy Maintenance Management System (SNMMS)
,
throughout the operating forces, under the direct sponsorship of
the Chief of Naval Operations, as set forth in the OPNAV Instruc-
tion 4700.16 series. The objective of this program "is the im-
provement of the material readiness of the fleet through improved
management of maintenance and material functions," with a January
1966 goal of "an improved, measurable state of material readiness
of the operating forces of the Navy with a significant increase
in the efficient management of the Navy's maintenance and material
resources."
SNMMS was introduced on a time-phased basis with little
advance notice because of the rapid development of a critical
situation within the field of maintenance. The program, as set
forth, was both broad in scope and ambitious. Since manning
levels, budgets and appropriations for the period were already
implemented, requirements were met through curtailments in areas
of lesser importance to the operating forces. To this end, the
Chief of Naval Operations established a project center to expedite
the development of the system. Further, since the urgency of the
requirement precluded "the luxury of routine prolonged Navy Depart-
ment review and processing of the project center's final project,"
Chief of Naval Operations, Standard Navy Mai ntenance Manage -
ment System







Chief of Naval Operations, Standard Navy Mai ntenance Manage -
ment System . OPNAV message 111 350Z. (Washington: 11 June, 19&+).
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all departmental agencies involved in the implementation of SNMMS
were required to provide representation at the project center.
This representation was to consist of "qualified and authoritative
individuals on a continuous basis."
As can be seen from the foregoing, the development and in-
stallation of SNMMS has been somewhat different that what we in
the Navy consider the norm in methods of evolution. It is not
the purpose or intention of this paper to consider the reasons
why an improvement in our archaic maintenance system was so long
in coming, but only to review and attempt to analyze what has
been accomplished and what is presently contemplated from the
viewpoint of its soundness and adherence to contemporary manage-
ment theories and procedures. In that regard it will do well to
remember that SNMMS is still under development and as such may
have undergone changes and modifications in policy and procedures
which have not been reflected in documents and other sources of
information presently available.
I. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
SNMMS is intended to "replace existing systems of maintenance
reporting, record keeping, and management," while retaining the
majority of basic supervisory positions as they now exist.
Within the ships of the operating forces, where maintenance is
normally performed in a number of departments by operating person-




Chief of Naval Personnel , Proposed Trai ning Plan To Support
The Introduction Of The Standard Navy Maintenance Management System
,
BUPERS letter, serial C21/1061, 6 April 1964, p. 2.
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department head to the individual man assigned to the job by way
of division officer and maintenance group supervisor. In addition,
a central maintenance control will be designated and assigned the
task of ensuring accuracy and completeness of all reports.
Aviation activities, such as squadrons, emphasize the in-
trinsic position of maintenance by the existence of the Mainte-
nance Department, usually the largest in terms of money spent,
personnel assigned, amount of support equipment retained, and
the degree of influence in the area of overall operational readi-
ness.
Assignment of Functions
Under SNMMS maintenance functions have been clearly assigned.
Responsibilities are delineated and administrative techniques
have been devised to schedule and control work compliance. Suf-
ficient control, without undue interference, was considered during
formulat ion.
Respons ibi 1 i ty
Emphasis is placed on the ultimate responsibility of the
Commanding Officer for material readiness through the coordination
and accomplishment of maintenance. Department heads are charged
with the responsibility for maintenance performance, coordination
with other departments as necessary, scheduling, ensuring com-
pliance, and the assignment of supervisory personnel. Division
officers are responsible for monitoring the various scheduling
devices and other tasks as directed. Maintenance group supervisors
hold the responsibility for the weekly scheduling, personnel

assignment, and performance of work assigned to the group.
Organ izat ion
SNMMS will utilize the traditional line-staff organization.
Shipboard organizations, although not as clearly defined as those
in aviation, are of the same general type.
There is no evidence that organizational structure was
critically considered in devising SNMMS. This may result from
either the known Navy resistance to the basic Air Force organi-
zation or the desire to preserve a traditional Navy structure.
Either way, the application of TCS has been compromised. The
obvious question concerns whether the existing structure is suit-
able for the performance of maintenance with a minimum of effort
and yet effectively provide to management the requisite means to
plan, schedule, and control.
The specialization base within SNMMS is the Maintenance Group.
In a destroyer this could be an engine room, fire room, or other
departmental functional space. In an aircraft squadron a delin-
eation is made along the lines of a system such as hydraulics,
communications, navigation, etc. The intent of this division is
to permit concentration of effort on the simplest possible component
of even the most complex hardware.
According to Johns, the "3 M System" was designed with full
consideration being given to ease and efficiency of management.
The Maintenance Group Supervisor, his men, and his superiors, each
5




have a clearly defined responsibility and associated authority.
The organization, according to Rasmussen, is compatible with the
6
exception principle. Each supervisor, in performing his function,
provides the next higher echelon with a simplified visual pre-
sentation of progress made contrasted with what was scheduled.
Extensive detail, which might tend to confuse when the system is
operating as designed, is not displayed, but is available upon
request. Guidance and direction is available and continuously
provided at all levels. Command is integrated into the system
for the purpose of providing full support and cooperation.
SNMMS is not primarily intended to set forth departmental
organization and billets. However, there is every likelihood
that the trend toward standardization among Navy activities will
be enhanced by it and the continually increasing requirement that
military problems be regarded as economic problems.
I I . SNMMS: THE NEED
Common sense and experience, supplemented by schools, bureau
manuals and manufacturer's guides, is no longer sufficient to
keep the fleet maintained and operat ing--steaming and flying.
Time has moved on, ships and aircraft are more complex, and special
ized training is a requirement for most maintenance functions. In-
house personnel can no longer efficiently and effectively perform
all that our equipment requires without extensive training. The
A. L. Rasmussen, "Maintenance System Changes Phase II,"
Approach
,
IX (June, 1964), 36-39.
Robert Neil, "Planned Maintenance: Here's How It Works,"
All Hands (August, 1964).
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seaman's eye approach, regulated by common sense, no longer does
the job properly. Paper, reports, and reams of directives pre-
viously were thought to be the answer. Equipment became more
complex and the volume of paperwork increased. The end of the
maze of paper was not in sight, but the limits of personnel, time,
and money was rapidly approaching. An urgent need for action
became apparent. The Chief of Naval Operations took action, the
result being SNMMS.
III. SNMMS: INSTALLATION
The installation and implementation of the "3 M System" has
been separated into two major parallel programs: (1) the develop-
ment and installation of a planned maintenance system (PMS),
referred to as Milestone Plan A; and, (2) the development of a
8
uniform maintenance data collection system, Milestone Plan B.
These programs are slated to provide the basis for uniform
planned maintenance, the collection of data in a form that will
facilitate machine processing, and the establishment of an
activity capable of processing and analyzing the maintenance in-
formation received. The analyzed data will then be utilized in
providing feedback and responsible assistance to the operating
, 9forces.




•^Department Of The Navy, Office Of The Secretary, Standard
Navy Ma i ntenance And Material Management System (3 M System)
.
SECNAVINST 5^30.69. (Washington: 21 October, 1964), p. 1.
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IV. PLANNED MAINTENANCE SYSTEM
Program Milestone Plan A, the Planned Maintenance System,
is being developed and installed throughout the operating forces
with emphasis being placed on maintenance at the lowest practicable
echelon.
Within Plan A, tasks are divided into four major segments:
1. Development of preventive maintenance documentation.
2. Development of uniform standards of maintenance planning,
control, and recording.
3. Installation of standard maintenance management throughout
the operating forces.
k. Development of a system to control the standards.
Documentat ion
Initially, a requirement existed for the evaluation and
standardization of all maintenance documents, regardless of source
or intent. This is presently being done with the view of criti-
cally examining the need and compatibility (with PMS) of documents
presently in existence. Extraneous materials, requirements and
procedures are to be eliminated. The resulting documents are to
be feasible; that is, consistent with the skills, time, and man-
12
power available within the operating forces. Once these criteria
have been satisfied, all maintenance documentation will be com-
patible with SNMMS.
t











Maintenance planning, control and recording systems have
tended to be profuse in the Navy. Some of these have emanated
from the bureaus while others originated with type commanders,
fleet commanders, and air wing commanders to name but a few. Many
of the procedures set forth are good and have been both efficient
and effective. However, they must all be reviewed so as to elim-
inate duplication, allow standardization on the best, and ensure
compatibility with the data collection and processing system.
One of the methods of achieving effective control which has
been utilized extensively in PMS is long range scheduling.
"Effective advance scheduling is the key to success in any
maintenance program. Proper use of ... scheduling devices ...
will ensure accomplishment of all preventive maintenance tasks
and will take into consideration the ... employment schedule and
daily routine, will provide intra-departmental coordination, and
provide adequate flexibility to allow adjustment to the schedule
when the situation dictates. The objective is to schedule
maintenance tasks at least one quarter ahead as soon as the subse-
quent quarter's employment is known. This plan may then be ad-
justed as contingencies demand. Emphasis must be placed on
advanced planning rather than on the recording of mere historical
maintenance facts.
"Intelligent use of the weekly schedule ... will ensure
definitive assignment of maintenance responsibility to a specific




coordinated with routine preventive maintenance: for example, a
required corrective maintenance action on a pump might provide an
excellent opportunity to accomplish a preventive maintenance
13
requirement that is scheduled or vice versa."
A key factor in effective, efficient management is complete
understanding of the duties and responsibilities assigned. The
Planned Maintenance System is provided with a number of "tools"
designed to assist in meeting this requirement.
Planned Maintenance System Manual -The Planned Maintenance
System Manual contains a compilation of the minimum preventive
maintenance requirements for each installed component or system.
These requirements were gleaned from a myriad of sources including
bureau manuals, manufacturer's instruction books, fleet and type
commanders directives, and the experience of operating personnel.
A compilation of this kind, to be thorough, requires critical
examination to eliminate extraneous material, but yet ensure that
all necessary requirements are included.
Cycle Schedule-The Cycle Schedule is a visual display of
preventive maintenance requirements, to be performed by a
particular maintenance group, based on the overhaul cycle. Issued
by the type commander, it shows all quarterly preventive mainte-
nance actions by system, sub-system or component. The Cycle
Schedule commences with the completion of overhaul and includes the




Proposed Advance Change to Chapter
11, NWP 50A. (Washington: undated), p. 5.
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capability of on-board personnel, and are scheduled so as to
equalize workload throughout the cycle.
Quarterly Schedule-Prepared by the department head in con-
junction with his division officers and maintenance group super-
visors, the Quarterly Schedule is based on the data set forth in
the Cycle Schedule with due consideration being given to operational
schedule requirements. It displays the entire preventive maintenance
workload for the quarter and directs maintenance group supervisors
scheduling weekly maintenance. Posted with the Cycle Schedule on
a control board, the Quarterly Schedule provides a view of the
overall maintenance program, pointing out problem areas where
special attention may be required. I terns not accomplished within
the current quarter are carried over to the subsequent Quarterly
Schedule.
Weekly Schedule-The Weekly Schedule, based on the directives
contained in the Quarterly Schedule, is prepared by the maintenance
group supervisor and is displayed in the group's working area. It
permits the daily scheduling of individuals to perform required
maintenance. Recurring maintenance, not specified in the long range
(Cycle and Quarterly) schedules, will be scheduled here. The group
supervisor will update the Quarterly Schedule at the end of each
week.
Maintenance Requirement Card (MRC) -The MRC is a 5 x 8 card
designed to set forth a specific planned maintenance action. It
contains the minimum required scheduling information and the
complete sequence of events to accomplish a certain preventive
21

maintenance task on an item of equipment. The MRC lists tools and
parts required, frequency, minimum skill levels, manhours to
accomplish, and other detailed information valuable to both per-
forming and supervisory personnel. A complete MRC deck will
supersede and eliminate preventive maintenance directives set
forth in the various maintenance related documents. The MRC,
originally developed for use on recent model aircraft, contains
sufficient details so as to be valuable in the development of
on-the-job-training programs. The content of the MRC is approved
by the cognizant technical bureau.
PMS Installation
Initial evaluation and review of existing procedures, and
the installation of PMS in the operating forces is to be carried
out by the Fleet Work Study Groups. Fleet and type commanders
are directed to assist in expediting introduction of SNMMS by
providing temporary personnel for training and assignment to
development and installation teams.
Post Installation Control
Standardization control of PMS, subsequent to installation,
will be through the procurement of adequate maintenance docu-
mentation, continuous evaluation of equipment maintenance require-
ments, installation of PMS in new construction, and adequate control
of documents available to the operating forces.
]L









V. MAINTENANCE DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM
Program Milestone B, the Maintenance Data Collection System
(MDCS) , is assigned the basic objective of providing "required
information and statistics as a basis upon which maintenance
managers can effectively and efficiently manage the Navy's
maintenance and material resources."
At the instigation of the Secretary of Defense, subsequent
to his declaration that Navy maintenance data compared unfavorably
with Air Force data, the Navy examined the Air Force Maintenance
Data Collection System as set forth in Air Force Manual 66-1.
Methods of data collection which had proven satisfactory in the
Air Force system were compared in detail with other data collection
systems. The methods thought to be best were taken and adapted to
Navy requirements. These requirements have been defined as the
best possible information to satisfy both management and technical
data requirements.
Operational Evaluation
Initial procedures adopted are presently being tested in an
operating environment by the Maintenance and Material Project
Center. Organized for the purpose of studying data processing
techniques, the Project Center, under the control of the Chief of
Naval Operations, has the mission of establishing and documenting
procedures for Navy-wide application.
The final data collection system decided upon is to reflect
1
6
OPNAVINST 4700.16A, op_. eft., p. 5-
Johns, ££. ci t . , p. 36.
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the results of this test. Recommendations to improve the system,
define functions and responsibilities, and eliminate redundancy
and inconsistency, are being solicited from both data producing
activities and the commands receiving the reports. Upon completion
of this evaluation phase, applicable methods and functions are to
be modified and refined as required.
VI. WHY PROCESS DATA?
Modern data collection and processing has the potential of
contributing to management problem solving in many ways. Complete
and detailed facts are kept readily available, routine operating
documents are produced and updated, masses of facts are reduced to
succinct, informative reports, while the condition of the enter-
prise can be continually analyzed and evaluated. Another con-
tribution of data processing is the instilling of a hope in
management that the current increasing trend in volume and cost
of paperwork can somehow be stopped and reversed.
Data Col lect ion
MDCS utilizes a system of codes which have been designed to
1
8
permit machine processing and mechanic/technician coding. These
codes provide the capability of recording the equipment and com-
ponent involved, the administrative organization, the work center,
how the malfunction occurred, the circumstances of discovery, and
the corrective action taken. In addition, information is available
concerning repair parts needed, type repair performed, what








activity performed the work, the nature of preventive or un-
scheduled maintenance (type availability) involved, and the
number of man-hours required.
Unfortunately, the collection system is manual. Human
operators record data by hand on the various report forms.
Intermediate operators, presently at type commander selected
locations, again transcribe the data from the report forms to
punch cards. Needless to say, this method is not only time con-
suming, but of perhaps greater importance, is susceptible to both
initial and intermediate operator induced errors.
Data Processing
Data is processed to obtain facts about operations and in-
formation for control. The ultimate aim is to provide manage-
ment with a timely, reliable source of readily accessible and
fully documented information. As such the data must be in a form
that facilitates search and retrieval of specific facts, and per-
mits the compilation of these facts into reports emphasizing the
points of interest or concern. Too much data, that is data un-
related to the subject to be analyzed, can be as detrimental to a
system as incomplete or inaccurate data.
The processing phase begins with the information generating
action and ends when the analysis has been completed, the records
have been brought up to date, and the documents and reports have
been generated. At times the documents and reports may themselves
be new data sources and as such continue the processing cycle.
Data processing will not be done within the individual units
25

of the operating forces. A Processing Center, functioning under
the type commander, is established for this purpose. At the
present time, key punch equipment, although programmed eventually
for destroyers and larger ships, is available only in the Center.
Data to be processed for use within the "3 M System" is delivered
to the Center by messenger or U. S. mail, there being no data
transmission equipment presently programmed for the operating
forces.
Was the decision to operate a data processing and analysis
system without data transmission equipment a sound one in light
of the fact that the raw data sources are in most cases mobile?
This situation, like the acceptance of the traditional Navy organi-
zation, reflects the "hardware" approach in an area where the in-
tegrated approach is a necessity. The "hardware" approach is
characterized by introducing a computer into an existing system
1
9
without the required change in management thinking.
Data Analys i s
Besides being able to provide facts directly concerning the
preventive maintenance accomplished, MDCS is designed with the
intent of facilitating thorough analysis of the basic problem area.
System reliability, failure rates based on operating time and in-
spection periods, and other maintenance and material matters, such
as spare parts provisioning information, is available within the
assembled data. The importance of form and method of storage, with
19
^Roger C. Vergin and Andrew J. Grimes, "Management Myths And
EDP," Cal ifornia Management Review
, VII (Fal 1 , 1964) , 63.
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the necessity of data retrieval in mind, is of utmost importance
here. If successful, the stored information is to be used as an
aid in manpower planning, budget computations, and cost analysis.
The analyzing function will be performed at both the type
commander's Processing Center and at a central processing activity.
Intentions are to utilize accounting machines at the Processing
Centers and a computer at the central activity. The computer is
capable of performing operations which, with proper information
available, will provide all the information mentioned above.
Accounting machine operations are of a more limited nature. They
are not as flexible as the automatic computer and will be utilized
to provide listings and keep track of man-hours, malfunctions,
useage, and similar information. In addition, the accounting
machines will compile the necessary data for human analysis.
VII. SUMMARY
SNMMS is intended to achieve maximum attainable material
readiness and efficiency through command attention, policy and
technical direction, and management control and administration of
all programs. Maintenance of the various systems, both old and
new, has been segmented into specific detailed procedures with the
view of attaining simplification and scheduling feasibility. The
data collection and analysis system, presently undergoing oper-
ational evaluation, reflects a familiarity with the concepts of
integrated data processing, while at the same time apparently
losing sight of the long range goal of a real-time system. This
is evidenced by the lack of noticeable concern surrounding the use
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of the mails and messenger service for data transmission purposes.
The organization upon which the "3 M System" is based is the
traditional military structure. No evidence exists in the various
publications, nor was any available through Fleet Work Study Group,
Pacific, that TSC and the integrated system were considered in
this area.
There exists a distinct possibility that SNMMS , as it is now
contemplated, embraces some fundamental weaknesses. Of greatest
concern are the methods of data collection/transmission and the
superficial analysis of the maintenance organizational structure.





The "3 M System" and its subdivisions, the Planned Mainte-
nance System and the Maintenance Data Collection System, appear
to have achieved wide spread acceptance. The Commander, Destroyer
Flotilla Nine, cites SNMMS effectiveness and recommends rapid
1
expansion of the system. He furnishes ample example of what a
well conceived, assiduously applied, systematic attack on known
maintenance deficiencies can accomplish in the "Stoddard Story,"
which relates one destroyer's remedial program. The Commander,
Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, reports that "activities
now working with the Air Force 66-1 system have expressed en-
thusiastic interest in the new ability to analyze in detail the
direction and results of their labor." This is a considerable
endorsement when at the same time CNAL units report that "the
information gathering capacity of the system immediately elimi-
_ - k
nates relatively few of present day [paper work) requirements."
Lot Ensey, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Cruiser-
Destroyer Flotilla Nine, official letter, serial 99, March 9, 1964,
3.
2
Charles L. Wall, Commander, U. S. Navy, Staff, Commander
Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Nine, official letter, February 24,
1964.
3
Paul H. Ramsey, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Naval Air




However, there presumably remain some doubters. Conceivably
there are officers and men in the Navy today who have had the
opportunity and experience to serve only in organizations which
exhibited all the magnificence of being run by an all knowing
born leader. Unfortunately, most of us frequently encountered
the fallible type manager who occasionally lacked information or
took questionable action. Therefore we see the need for a system
that supplies a service-wide facility for measurement, a systematic
method of solving problems, and a format for quantifying operational
needs which is more sensitive to the operator's view. However,
are we willing to accept the all encompassing "3 M System?" If
we do, will the personnel in doubt as to the need accept it?
Integrated Data Processing
One of the first questions the reader might ask is why the
Navy would saddle its operating forces with a mass maintenance
management tool such as integrated data processing (IDP). Haven't
the operating forces consistently achieved victory with the con-
tinually evolving conventional maintenance systems? Aren't modern
sophisticated aircraft, ships, and missiles still effectively
maintained by these systems? True, it would be difficult to deny
the value of IDP to the shore establishment which is similar in so
many ways to many of the nations extremely successful IDP oriented
commercial enterprises. However, the operating forces have always
functioned under a different discipline. They are managed by
military professionals who have been well schooled throughout their
careers in the art (or science) of achieving victory in combat
while ensuring economy of forces, rather than in minimizing costs
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to maximize profit in a competitive society.
The answer as to why I DP should be installed may not be
obvious. However, the universal understanding that management,
either in the context of naval operating forces at sea or commer-
cial enterprises ashore, requires information in order to manage
is obvious. This information must be received accurately, in a
timely manner, and without excessive effort. The requirement for
reports containing information are the key to "selling" data pro-
cessing. IDP is a refinement in the field of automatic data pro-
cessing (ADP) . Rather than collecting piece meal bits of infor-
mation, some of value and others not, IDP calls for systematic
organization, coordination, and an uninterrupted flow of essential
data needed by management to exercise the functions of planning,
organizing, direction, and control.
Maintenance management must always be interested in improving
quality, promoting effectiveness and achieving maximum efficiency.
Without this desire, it would be impossible to compete in this era
of rapid, continuing technological change. In the past, reports
that placed emphasis on the historical situation were satisfactory
for day to day or even combat operations. However, today we must
have a reporting system that is compatible with the need for timely
information on historical, current, and future events. Further, the
reports must be so formulated, and the system so arranged, that
trends will become immediately evident.
Reports, however, are only the means. The end results very
definitely hinge on both the capability of management and the
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significance of the reports. Efficiency and effectiveness of the
system reflects the timeliness, accuracy, and conciseness of the
information contained within the report. Here again an integrated
system of data collection, designed so as to reduce the chaff--un-
needed and unwarranted volume—and emphasize the significant facts,
is the answer.
The Exception Principle
SNMMS is proclaimed to be a system that provides the manager
with the significant facts. Evidences of adherence to the ex-
ception principle are encountered in various areas, i.e., man-hour
accounting, and the work schedules which are a part of the control
board. If the exception principle is adopted to any degree, the
manager, now deluged with publications, requirements, reports, and
vast amounts of other unnecessary details would be free to truly
manage. He would find it necessary to peruse only specific, con-
densed reports designed to focus the system and his attention on
significant variations from the predetermined standards.
However, before management by exception can be effectively
implemented, a set of decision rules must be formulated. These
decision rules would include the following:
What is a routine matter?
What is a significant fact?
When is a variation significant?
What is the relationship to predetermined standards?
These are typical questions that must be answered. It can be seen
that areas which in the past have been only subjectively treated
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now must necessarily be quantified. By reducing these areas to
specifics, then to mathematical expressions where possible, many
problems of the manager can be eliminated. Whereas in the past
it might be reasonably ascertained that certain practices could
lead only to reduced readiness, it can now be proven. This
system of management is now the approved and highly desired goal
for the Department of Defense.
Difficulties of the Past
It was noted in Chapter ! that a standardized Navy-wide air-
craft maintenance organization was directed in 1959. This organi-
zation, although it exists today, was not highly successful or
widely accepted in its early years.
An important factor in this lack of acceptance was that little
planning accompanied implementation. Any effort made to provide
information and training to the personnel involved in operating
force maintenance was not apparent. Many commands reorganized
only because they had to. Few managers realized that their organi-
zations were expensive, rather inefficient remnants of bygone days.
No "selling" program was conducted. Benefits that could be achieved
through reorganization were not made evident. The existence of
"inertia" involving the resistance to change was overlooked. Some-
where along the chain of command some very important management
principles were not considered. This management error caused a
state of confusion which is only now being fully eliminated. But,





There has long been a need within the Navy for a reliable
method of forecasting accurate personnel requirements. In recent
years we have depended on the system manufacturing contractor to
furnish information concerning personnel based on equipment utili-
zation, time between inspections, etc. Although this method has
worked fairly well, it did not solve the problem concerning older
equipment. This proved quite serious since the older equipment
generally required a greater proportion of maintenance and hence
a greater share of the personnel
.
The need for an accurate way of determining personnel require-
ments became clearly evident when the Navy began to encounter the
Department of Defense demands for proof of efficiency. The point
that military decisions are basically economic decisions was
forcefully made clear. Where in the past allocations frequently
resulted from the mere statement of necessity, now emerged a
situation where alternative allocations and methods were closely
cons idered.
An important area of the 1959 aircraft maintenance organization
which would have provided personnel requirement information was
generally rejected. This was a man-hour accounting system. Few
commands understood the reasons for such a system or considered it
of great enough importance to bother with. Resistance was en-
countered with the mere mention of recording the employment and
whereabouts of personnel. The result was that man-hour accounting
became an optional function. At the present time BUWEPS Instruction
3h

4700.2 describes a man-hour accounting system, intimates that a
similar system is mandatory, but then backs off to a permissive
approach by stating "that the analysis of some effective man-hour
accounting system is the most valid means to justify changes in
personnel allowance to CN0. M ->
Exception Time Accounting in SNMMS
Exception time accounting (ETA) is an integral part of the
data collection portion of SNMMS. ETA is designed to provide
management with man-hour information which might indicate trends
as well as set forth specific current information. Closely
adhered to, ETA is expected to provide an accurate standardized
procedure for detecting deviations from planned programs at a
minimum cost.
The ideal work situation, where a man works the entire day
at his assigned job, is the basis of the system. Any time a man
is absent from his job during normal working hours an exception
exists and a report is made. The exceptions are totaled by
Maintenance Group at the end of a designated period, and compared
to a listing of the manhours available during the same period.
Management then has the information at hand which with competent
analysis should indicate areas of concern. Excessive utilization
of personnel for other than their primary assignments will be
evident as will special liberty, personal errands, lag, and travel
time.
->Chief Of The Bureau Of Naval Weapons, The Naval Ai rcraf
t
Maintenance Program




ETA is currently scheduled for introduction into all in-
dustrial type activities. Included in this category are aircraft
squadrons and ships with repair departments.
The "3 M System" Approach
The "3 M System," unlike the 1959 aviation maintenance
organization, is utilizing a program of indoctrination and
training during the installation stage. Fleet Training Centers
are providing formal training to operating force personnel while
the Fleet Work Study Groups, in addition to training instructors
for the Training Centers, are providing MDCS implementation teams
which tour the fleet. For the long term, Bureau of Naval Person-
nel schools will modify their curricula so as to properly indoc-
trinate all enlisted and officer personnel reporting to the
operating forces after initial system installation.
Weaknesses of SNMMS.
The literature and information now available on SNMMS in-
dicates very few areas of weakness. Quite possibly this is a
true portrayal of the system. On the other hand, the general
shortage of literature and information from Navy sources, other
than high levels of management and the SNMMS implementation mana-
gers, the Fleet Work Study Groups, might in itself conceal the
existence of extensive problem areas. Areas of weakness, apparent
at this time are:
(1) The almost total absence of in-house Navy personnel
familiar with the modern tools of management.
(2) The lack of a top level, flag rank billet, directly in
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the chain of command, with the responsibility for developing,
directing and controlling the implementation of SNMMS.
(3) The failure to readily acknowledge that the Naval Air-
craft Maintenance Program, first implemented in 1959, and still
in existence, has not been a complete success.
(k) The inability to maintain the ambitious time-phased
plan of installation as promulgated.
(5) The exemption of maintenance organization structure
from the total systems analysis.
(6) The methods of data collection/transmission are time
consuming and highly susceptible to operator induced errors.
In-house Personnel -At the present time the Navy does not
have the in-house capability of developing, installing, or
operating the data processing system that is a very necessary
part of SNMMS. This function is now provided by the combined
effort of a Navy-industry team in which the industry members
must be readily available and thoroughly familiar with Navy methods
c
and requirements. Fortunately this shortcoming is recognized.
However, as yet nothing that will provide a long range solution
to the problem has been initiated. This is not to say that the
training of Navy personnel for SNMMS is not underway, because it
is. However, the training presently being conducted, and that
planned for the future, is only sufficient to provide the minimum
amount of necessary knowledge to the operators. There is no in-
dication that a program intended to educate personnel in the design
Chief of Naval Operations, Standard Navy Mai ntenance Manage -






and capabilities of a data processing system is contemplated.
The Of f icer- in-Charge, Fleet Work Study Group, Pacific, has
expressed a need for an officer with a management/computer
education. This need is supported by statements set forth in
OPNAVINST 4700.16A.
A survey of the mission of the Study Group indicated that a
graduate of the Management Data Processing curriculum would be of
great benefit. The chance that a graduate will be ordered there
appears slight when the existing billets call for line officers;
this year's Data Processing class consists of all Supply Corps
officers with the exception of two aviators, two Marine officers,
and one Wave.
Fl ag Rank B i 1 let -A maintenance position at or near the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations level, in the chain of com-
mand, would give SNMMS an additional look of permanence and
authority. The development and implementation of modernized and
improved programs would quite probably reflect a more continuous
pattern in the future. The likelihood of another archaic mainten-
ance system developing would be remote. As a secondary benefit,
the career opportunities for maintenance specialists, now limited,
would be greatly enhanced.
Naval Aircraft Maintenance Program -SNMMS could quite possibly
be adversely affected by the failure to admit that the subject pro-
gram was not completely successful. Existing maintenance short-
comings are being set forth in an effort to convince personnel that
SNMMS is needed. However, these shortcomings are being mentioned
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in general rather than attributing them to a specific type unit.
No information has been found that is critical of the installation
methods utilized with the Aircraft Maintenance System or with the
system itself. Personnel who observed and endured unpleasant
experiences with the aircraft program might tend to resist SNMMS
due to a belief of near complete similarity and evolution. A
forthright statement, pointing out how SNMMS is soundly based on
specific proven management concepts, and how efforts have been
made to avoid the pitfalls encountered by the prior program,
would be an aid in gaining acceptance.
Phase-in Delay-The "3 M System" is presently behind imple-
mentation schedule. The phase-in plan originally decided upon
was very ambitious and was made early in SNMMS's life. It called
for the system to be in full operation in something on the order
of four years. The present lag could be caused by a number of
things including superficial planning, incomplete knowledge of
what was entailed, and inexperienced personnel. Superficial
planning can be disregarded, since there is ample evidence of
extremely well planned actions already executed and scheduled for
the future. Incomplete knowledge, since SNMMS is a new concept,
certainly is a factor. However, it appears that the lack of in-
house personnel with the proper background and experience has been
the main di f f icul ty.
Organizational Structure
In 1964, the number of "levels" of Navy aviation maintenance
was reduced from six to three with various changes taking place at
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all levels. Of greatest importance was the shirt of Air Station
Aircraft Maintenance Department emphasis from station aircraft to
the direct support of Fleet aircraft. This change reflects to a
certain degree the present Air Force organization headed by a
Chief of Maintenance. However, the Navy organization mentioned
is at the "intermediate" level. Individual squadrons still con-
duct all "organizational" level maintenance independently. As
such, duplication of effort continues to exist.
Maintenance in ships is conducive to a greater degree of dupli-
cation than in aviation. Where in aviation, one department performs
the vast majority of maintenance evolutions, in ships each depart-
ment performs its own. Only during periods of maintenance avail-
ability, when a yard or tender force performs the work, is co-
ordination likely to exist. TSC applied to this situation would
at least provide a number of avenues for further study. Additional
analysis may not produce desirable alternatives, but documented
facts would be presented to justify the existing organizations.
For example, a system similar to that being utilized by the Air
Force can work in carrier aviation. There is no apparent reason
why a billet equivalent to the Air Force Chief of Maintenance cannot
be established at Navy air wing or higher level. Such a change would
eliminate duplication and, hopefully, reduce personnel requirements.
An adaptation of the organization would also work in a ship. A
"maintenance" department could be established to undertake those
functions now performed by diverse operators.
Data Col lection/Transmiss ion -The fact that data transmission
ifO

equipment is presently not programmed for the fleet is a serious
handicap for a quick-time system. However, of greater concern is
the vast opportunity for personnel induced error in the collection
phase.
An Air Force story making the rounds concerns an activity
that has for months used the action taken code describing
"painting" on all maintenance action reports. These reports have
included fuel control failures, radio failures, and the like.
With approximately four and one-half million pieces of paper
generated each month by AFM 66-1, the reason for this coding has
yet to be determined.
The moral of this story is that honest errors, "gun decking,"
or an outright attempt at being a comic will foul the system.
Presently, only education and controls will prevent the latter two
difficulties. Honest errors may also be reduced by these methods,
but the best way to achieve their elimination is through pro-
cedures that reduce exposure. The ultimate answer will be an auto-
matic input to the system from the equipment itself, independent of
the maintenance man. This method is a possibility of the future,
but for the present we must reduce to a minimum handling and trans-
cribing of data.
The present system, utilizing forms completed by the maintenance
man and cards punched at the Processing Center is totally unsatis-
factory. Once key punch equipment reaches the ships the situation
will improve, but the intermediate man will still be utilized.






However, the shipboard maintenance control function, properly
supervised, can provide an adequate verification check when teamed
with a reasonably educated conscientious maintenance man. The
problem therefore is to find the requisite maintenance man. If
the FUR system is any indication of what to expect, a tremendous
problem, yet unrecognized, exists.
Lessons Learned
Little if any evidence exists which would indicate that the
Navy has profited from past shortcomings since the aircraft
maintenance reorganization of 1959 and prior to the advent of the
"3 M System." One negative example is the Naval Air Training and
Operating Procedures Standardization program, known as NATOPS , which
was rushed into existence in 1961.
Operational activities were disrupted and demoralized by the
creation of a NATOPS staff position which by its description was
to facilitate an informer function. NATOPS manuals, incomplete,
inaccurate, and at best copies of existing materials, were rapidly
promulgated under the cloak of filling the gap between the NWP's
and specific aircraft flight manuals. Planning was nil, personnel
were not informed promptly and adequately as to what could be
expected. Limited facts and exaggerated knowledge of the Air Force
pilot standardization program, which was purported to eliminate all
pilot prerogatives, caused a further down-turn in morale. Controls,
in the form of ground and flight training checks, were so devised
as to be voluminous and complicated. The resulting flight training
adjective grading system was psychologically adverse.

Ultimately, NATOPS didn't turn out to be the ogre first
described. In fact at times the program gives indications of
wilting away. In either event, however, the methods, procedures,
and techniques, involved in all aspects of NATOPS, were not proper.
The program was implemented as though it were the first extensive
change ever made in any organization. Known and widely accepted
management techniques were overlooked or disregarded. In essence,
what could have been a very useful program is still operating under
the handicap created at the time of its conception.
Summary
The "3 M System" is being proclaimed as the answer to Navy
maintenance difficulties and well it may be. In areas where the
system is operating, managers speak of it in glowing terms.
Problems do exist, but where recognized they are presently well
in hand. Methods and techniques of leadership and management,
not previously evident in maintenance organizations, are well






The Standard Navy Maintenance Management System, in its
entirety, is a long needed step toward the goal of improved
fleet and material readiness. It was designed by a Navy-
industry team of experts and takes full advantage of the
majority of recognized management and data processing techni-
ques and principles.
The "3 M System," unlike so many Navy programs, is based
on a careful analysis of the requirements and tasks to be
accomplished. Changes were not made for the sake of change
or in a piecemeal fashion. The individual man, and each level
of management, was thoroughly considered before any changes
were executed. An information system, comparable with the
best, was established to promulgate the "word" concerning
SNMMS. Published information, both official and unofficial,
although highly optimistic, is carefully designed to set forth
the facts. No deliberate attempt to conceal the systems ul-
timate objective is encountered. Attempts of this nature have
been prevalent in the past.
The bibliographical material researched concurs with the
majority of procedures used within SNMMS. The directives con-
cerning the "3 M System," supplemented by the various magazine
articles, set forth many contemporary management ideas and
techniques. Extensive benefits, to the Navy as a whole, should
be derived from "spin off" SNMMS's information.

The "3 M System" holds very close to the total systems
concept in all areas with the exception of organizational
analysis and data transmission.
In the organizational area, there is no evidence sup-
porting any structural consideration. This may be a funda-
mental flaw capable of contributing to SNMMS failure. Since
the system is still in the installation phase it is possible
to proceed with an organizational structure, analysis at this
time. Should the present structure be found sound and com-
patible with SNMMS, system implementation will have been
delayed, but not without worthwhile results. Foremost of
these would be the emphasis on existing good management
exemplified by a willingness to investigate doubtful areas.
If the structure is found lacking, necessary changes can be
made prior to final SNMMS installation. This finding would
be a blow to the prestige of the "3 M System," but it need
not be fatal. Determination of incompatibility at some later
date may destroy SNMMS and substantially hinder other programs
both in and out of maintenance.
Industrial type activities, which are functionally or-
ganized to achieve a maintenance objective, possess a struc-
ture that can be modified with relative ease and occasionally
is. However, in combatant ships, the traditional organization
has changed very little since the advent of steam. In either
case, the apparent failure to conduct a thorough analysis con-




Without an adequate method of transmitting data, the
entire Maintenance Data Collection System is rendered in-
effective. This situation, serious as it is, may be better
than one in which carelessly collected, inaccurate data is
speedily transmitted. The latter case then is of prime im-
portance since the former tends to be obvious.
The methods now under evaluation in MDCS do not have
controls which will ensure accuracy. In fact SNMMS , as it
exists, calls for the execution of maintenance action and
related reports at the lowest possible level. If we con-
sider the results of a similar plan in the FUR system, it
should become immediately obvious that the current version of
MDCS won't work. The man who does the work is just not in-
terested in filling out required reports. At times this lack
of interest is accompanied by basic inability to understand
and perform the "paper work" function. Furthermore, the
maintenance man's disinterest and inability sometimes exists
at various supervisory levels up the chain of command.
Obviously then, other data collection methods must be
developed. Since automatic inputs are unlikely in the near
future, they are not the answer. In fact, no simple answer
exists. The best approach the Navy can make at this time is
to contract for a detailed study of what other organizations,
both military and civilian, are doing under similar conditions.
A solution to the collection problem must be accompanied
by an adequate transmission system. It will be difficult to

justify any expenditures in the areas of collection or processing
in light of the transmission methods contemplated. The best ot
data, unless timely, is useless.
Computers have been designed and programmed to assist humans
in numerous ways. They are useful in scientific, scheduling,
inventory, accounting, and game playing applications, to name but
a few. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the quality of out-
put will at best reflect the quality of input. The quality of
input, although not totally dependent on timeliness, is influenced
greatly by it.
Another area that may cause difficulty is the tremendous
number of reports that SNMMS will generate. As noted, AFM 66-1
generates four and one-half million pieces of paper each month.
Prorated, this will be a significant number of reports emanating
from each activity. Unfortunately, in most cases, existing
reports will not be eliminated in the immediate future.
Conceivably, the entire SNMMS could be discarded as a
result of unsatisfactory data transmission/processing. This
recently happened in one business concern. Specifically, the
level of ignorance within the business was such that an ad-
vertising campaign was based on the scrapping of data processing
equipment. Apparently the executives concerned failed to re-
cognize that the "garbage out" only reflected the "garbage in,"
]
which in turn reflected managements knowledge and ability.





Of paramount interest is how the Navy achieved a commendable
level of total systems analysis so close on the heels of the in-
ept step into NATOPS. Because of the NATOPS introduction and of
other recent programs, efforts should be made to accentuate the
differences in concept between them and SNMMS so that the degree
of adverse inertia encountered will be decreased.
In conclusion, it is quite apparent that the "3 M System"
is a highly desirable, well developed and implemented, long
needed step forward in Navy maintenance circles. The system
design compares favorably to the theories of a broad spectrum of
management experts.
SNMMS has been exceptionally well controlled by the Mainte-
nance and Material Management Project Center. The installation
of the system into the fleet, by the Fleet Work Study Groups, has
reflected an admirable degr§e of forethought, planning and re-
sourcefulness. The FWSG training programs, supplemented by





U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings , have gone a long way in sup-
pressing inevitable change-opposing inertia.
Suggestions For Further Research
Being a new system currently under development, all aspects
of SNMMS are available for further research and analysis. However,
of greatest concern and worthy of immediate study are the funda-
mental weaknesses noted in the areas of data collection/transmission
and management hierarchy. It is truly inconceivable that a com-
prehensive plan such as the "3 M System" can consider the prescribed
input method, the mails and messenger service, compatible with the
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advanced techniques oeing utilized throughout the remainder of the
system. Furthermore, even though the maintenance organizational
structure may ultimately be proven sound, it must be analyzed.
The bibliography assembled here will probably be outdated
rapidly as a result of changes brought on through system evalu-
ation and modifications. However, the concepts and techniques
prescribed by management authorities will continue to provide a
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24 February 1 96^+
From: Commander Charles L. WALL, U.S. Navy, 224184/1100
To: Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla NINE
Care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California
Subj: Material Readiness
1. During recent conversations we have discussed the enviable
record of material readiness achieved by USS STODDARD (DD-566)
,
a 20 year old 2100 ton destroyer, as evidenced by only one
significant equipment outage during the four months (to date)
of its current assignment with SEVENTH Fleet. As suggested by
you I have reduced to writing a summary of the material status
of that vessel and actions taken during the period of my com-
mand, June 1962 to February 1964, to achieve and maintain the
current state of readiness. In addition I have attempted to
draw some conclusions and offer recommendations which may be
of val ue to others.
2. At the conclusion of a SEVENTH fleet tour in June 1962
electronics and ordnance readiness had deteriorated badly. The
engineering plant was fully operational but feed water consump-
tion was excessive.
3. During the period July - December 1962 the ship was able to
maintain its operating schedule in EASTPAC and on short notice
performed escort duties in connection with the Cuban Quarantine
during October and November. Throughout this period the best
efforts of ship's force were sufficient only to maintain the
status quo; there was little, if any, improvement in material
readiness and the performance of various equipments. Although
unable to achieve any significant improvement in readiness and
performance, ship's force personnel were able to identify and
to document the nature and probable extent of deficiencies and
to plan a comprehensive program for the utilization of ship's
force, tender, and shipyard efforts during the Interim Availabil-
ity scheduled for the first quarter of FY 1963.
4. Although the final funding of the shipyard phase of the
Interim Availability approximated that afforded other ships of
the type, the initial funding did net provide for all required
work. The necessity for the repair of additional items, how-
ever, was supported by operating records and inspections and the
required funds were granted. At the conclusion of the shipyard
period (30 March 1963) all known items of a major nature except
the retubing of boiler superheaters had been accomplished. (See
paragraph 6 in connection with superheaters.)
55

5. During the period May-June 1963 the Planned Maintenance Sys-
tem (PMS) was installed in the Engineering Department and at about
the same time efforts were directed toward preparation for over-
seas movement (POM) in October 1963 f° r a normal tour with SEVENTH
Fleet. Representative units of major equipments such as forced
draft blowers, condensate pumps, feed booster pumps, and fuel
oil pumps that were apparently operating normally were selected
for early PMS inspection. In many instances these inspections
revealed unsuspected deterioration and the need for early repair.
When required the units that had been opened were overhauled at
that time and the records of other units of the same type were
reviewed. It was concluded that those with a similar operational
and repair history would be in approximately the same condition
and, hence, would also require overhaul. Not all of the parts
required for these overhauls were contained in COSAL and those
in COSAL were not on board in sufficient quantity to perform the
number of overhauls contemplated. It was soon apparent that the
normal OPTAR could not be managed so as to provide these repair
parts and the other items essential to a successful POM. An
augmentation of OPTAR was obtained from the Type Commander on the
basis of equipment condition as supported by the PMS findings and
a logical schedule of overhaul by ship's force. The majority
of this work was concluded prior to overseas movement. However,
it was necessary to defer a portion for accomplishment during
scheduled upkeep time while in the SEVENTH Fleet.
6. The superheater tubes in two boilers were in marginal con-
dition at the time of the Interim Availability. However, the
fact that they would withstand the prescribed hydrostatic
pressure and were otherwise operational precluded the expenditure
of substantial funds for their retubing at that time. In August
1963 during boiler maintenance in connection with the POM a
number of tubes in one of the superheaters failed to meet hydro-
static pressure requirements. This evidence of condition and the
imminent departure of the ship for duty with SEVENTH Fleet proved
to be sufficient justification for the renewal of all the super-
heater tubes in both boilers.
7. Upon joining SEVENTH Fleet approximately 98% of the repair
parts in the COSAL were on board and the remaining 2% were on
order. In addition the parts for scheduled, but as yet uncom-
pleted, overhauls of PMS origin and other selected non-COSAL items
of an insurance nature were on board. Routine maintenance and
planned equipment overhaul has continued as practicable for at
sea and in port and during scheduled upkeep periods. Except for
the one fuel oil booster pump casualty which required complete
replacement of the unit, equipment outages have been corrected
as occuring. Although some needed repair parts have been obtained
from ships in company, corrective action has normally been pos-
sible from resources within the ship.
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8. Cone 1 us ions
.
a. A high degree of material readiness can be achieved by
an orderly, we.i planned program of ship's force work, adequately
supported by repair parts and materials, and assisted by outside
(tender and shipyard) resources to the extent justified.
b. Management of maintenance and repair resources depends
upon the full knowledge of material conditions which is obtain-
able through a comprehensive schedule of tests and inspections
(PMS) in conjunction with regular operating records.
c. In order to achieve maximum material readiness for
assignment to SEVENTH Fleet as for any other high priority per-
iod or task the schedule of tests and inspections (PMS) must be
keyed to that assignment.
d. A fully funded COSAL will normally provide sufficient
in-house resources with which to maintain a high state of readi-
ness once that condition has been achieved.
9. Recommendation. It is recommended that the PMS be oriented
to POM in such a manner that the requirement for non-COSAL
repair parts and for COSAL items in excess of allowance can be
anticipated and planned for. It should be axiomatic that all
known defects are corrected during the POM period.
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